netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries

[ Upstream commit e799299aafed417cc1f32adccb2a0e5268b3f6d5 ]

We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 84b8486e9cedc93875f251ba31abcf73bd586a3a)
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jason Xing 2024-03-04 16:20:39 +08:00 committed by Vegard Nossum
parent 75af2f874a
commit 6e9e490c1c

View File

@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
nr->t2 =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay);
nr->n2 =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries);
msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries));
nr->t4 =
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay);
nr->idle =