* 'linux-4.14.y' of https://github.com/openela/kernel-lts: (176 commits)
LTS: Update to 4.14.343
crypto: af_alg - Work around empty control messages without MSG_MORE
crypto: af_alg - Fix regression on empty requests
spi: spi-mt65xx: Fix NULL pointer access in interrupt handler
net/bnx2x: Prevent access to a freed page in page_pool
hsr: Handle failures in module init
rds: introduce acquire/release ordering in acquire/release_in_xmit()
hsr: Fix uninit-value access in hsr_get_node()
net: hsr: fix placement of logical operator in a multi-line statement
usb: gadget: net2272: Use irqflags in the call to net2272_probe_fin
staging: greybus: fix get_channel_from_mode() failure path
serial: 8250_exar: Don't remove GPIO device on suspend
rtc: mt6397: select IRQ_DOMAIN instead of depending on it
rtc: mediatek: enhance the description for MediaTek PMIC based RTC
tty: serial: samsung: fix tx_empty() to return TIOCSER_TEMT
serial: max310x: fix syntax error in IRQ error message
clk: qcom: gdsc: Add support to update GDSC transition delay
NFS: Fix an off by one in root_nfs_cat()
net: sunrpc: Fix an off by one in rpc_sockaddr2uaddr()
scsi: bfa: Fix function pointer type mismatch for hcb_qe->cbfn
...
Change-Id: Ib9b7d4f4fbb66b54b4fc2d35e945418da4c02331
Signed-off-by: Richard Raya <rdxzv.dev@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 787f1b2800464aa277236a66eb3c279535edd460 ]
"struct bvec_iter" is defined with the __packed attribute, so it is
aligned on a single byte. On X86 (and on other architectures that support
unaligned addresses in hardware), "struct bvec_iter" is accessed using the
8-byte and 4-byte memory instructions, however these instructions are less
efficient if they operate on unaligned addresses.
(on RISC machines that don't have unaligned access in hardware, GCC
generates byte-by-byte accesses that are very inefficient - see [1])
This commit reorders the entries in "struct dm_verity_io" and "struct
convert_context", so that "struct bvec_iter" is aligned on 8 bytes.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZcLuWUNRZadJr0tQ@fedora/T/
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8338d971f919256b312f28a9a320f552a499dc8e)
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
commit 38bc1ab135db87577695816b190e7d6d8ec75879 upstream.
dm_verity_fec_io is placed after the end of two hash digests. If the hash
digest has unaligned length, struct dm_verity_fec_io could be unaligned.
This commit fixes the placement of struct dm_verity_fec_io, so that it's
aligned.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a739ff3f543a ("dm verity: add support for forward error correction")
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If androidboot.vbmeta.invalidate_on_error is 'yes' and
androidboot.vbmeta.device is set and points to a device with vbmeta
magic, this header will be overwritten upon an irrecoverable dm-verity
error. The side-effect of this is that the slot will fail to verify on
next reboot, effectively triggering the boot loader to fallback to
another slot. This work both if the vbmeta struct is at the start of a
partition or if there's an AVB footer at the end.
This code is based on drivers/md/dm-verity-chromeos.c from ChromiumOS.
Bug: 31622239
Test: Manually tested (other arch).
Change-Id: I571b5a75461da38ad832a9bea33c298bef859e26
Signed-off-by: David Zeuthen <zeuthen@google.com>
This allows platforms that are CPU/memory contrained to verify data
blocks only the first time they are read from the data device, rather
than every time. As such, it provides a reduced level of security
because only offline tampering of the data device's content will be
detected, not online tampering.
Hash blocks are still verified each time they are read from the hash
device, since verification of hash blocks is less performance critical
than data blocks, and a hash block will not be verified any more after
all the data blocks it covers have been verified anyway.
This option introduces a bitset that is used to check if a block has
been validated before or not. A block can be validated more than once
as there is no thread protection for the bitset.
These changes were developed and tested on entry-level Android Go
devices.
Bug: 72664474
Change-Id: Ie5f1ffda93c7f48e95b90ca80fe3f896c11f7baf
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 843f38d382b1ca2f6f4ae2ef7c35933e6319ffbb)
Signed-off-by: Patrik Torstensson <totte@google.com>
v4.4 introduced changes to the callbacks used for
dm-linear and dm-verity-target targets. Move to those headers
in dm-android-verity.
Verified on hikey while having
BOARD_USES_RECOVERY_AS_BOOT := true
BOARD_BUILD_SYSTEM_ROOT_IMAGE := true
BUG: 27339727
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: Ic64950c3b55f0a6eaa570bcedc2ace83bbf3005e
This device-mapper target is virtually a VERITY target. This
target is setup by reading the metadata contents piggybacked
to the actual data blocks in the block device. The signature
of the metadata contents are verified against the key included
in the system keyring. Upon success, the underlying verity
target is setup.
BUG: 27175947
Change-Id: I7e99644a0960ac8279f02c0158ed20999510ea97
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
[AmitP: Folded following android-4.9 commit changes into this patch
56f6a6b2b1cd ("ANDROID: dm-android-verity: Rebase on top of 4.1")]
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Use of the synchronous digest API limits dm-verity to using pure
CPU based algorithm providers and rules out the use of off CPU
algorithm providers which are normally asynchronous by nature,
potentially freeing CPU cycles.
This can reduce performance per Watt in situations such as during
boot time when a lot of concurrent file accesses are made to the
protected volume.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
CC: Ondrej Mosnáček <omosnacek+linux-crypto@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
If ignore_zero_blocks is enabled dm-verity will return zeroes for blocks
matching a zero hash without validating the content.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Add support for correcting corrupted blocks using Reed-Solomon.
This code uses RS(255, N) interleaved across data and hash
blocks. Each error-correcting block covers N bytes evenly
distributed across the combined total data, so that each byte is a
maximum distance away from the others. This makes it possible to
recover from several consecutive corrupted blocks with relatively
small space overhead.
In addition, using verity hashes to locate erasures nearly doubles
the effectiveness of error correction. Being able to detect
corrupted blocks also improves performance, because only corrupted
blocks need to corrected.
For a 2 GiB partition, RS(255, 253) (two parity bytes for each
253-byte block) can correct up to 16 MiB of consecutive corrupted
blocks if erasures can be located, and 8 MiB if they cannot, with
16 MiB space overhead.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
verity_for_bv_block() will be re-used by optional dm-verity object.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Prepare for an optional verity object to make use of existing dm-verity
structures and functions.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
