4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
glider@google.com
a7eda6eddc BACKPORT: security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variables
Upstream commit f0fe00d4972a8cd4b98cc2c29758615e4d51cdfe.

In addition to -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern (used by
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL now) Clang also supports zero initialization for
locals enabled by -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero. The future of this flag
is still being debated (see https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45497).
Right now it is guarded by another flag,
-enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang,
which means it may not be supported by future Clang releases. Another
possible resolution is that -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero will persist
(as certain users have already started depending on it), but the name
of the guard flag will change.

In the meantime, zero initialization has proven itself as a good
production mitigation measure against uninitialized locals. Unlike pattern
initialization, which has a higher chance of triggering existing bugs,
zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings, pointers, indexes,
and sizes. On the other hand, pattern initialization remains safer for
return values. Chrome OS and Android are moving to using zero
initialization for production builds.

Performance-wise, the difference between pattern and zero initialization
is usually negligible, although the generated code for zero
initialization is more compact.

This patch renames CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL to CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
and introduces another config option, CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO, that
enables zero initialization for locals if the corresponding flags are
supported by Clang.

Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200616083435.223038-1-glider@google.com
Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Change-Id: I2c76341a2b5f207b0b751293f2022b5ef99dbc45
2020-09-02 15:58:54 +02:00
Alexander Potapenko
8a4e1fcd4b BACKPORT: mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Upstream commit 6471384af2a6530696fc0203bafe4de41a23c9ef.

Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10.

Provide init_on_alloc and init_on_free boot options.

These are aimed at preventing possible information leaks and making the
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.

Enabling either of the options guarantees that the memory returned by the
page allocator and SL[AU]B is initialized with zeroes.  SLOB allocator
isn't supported at the moment, as its emulation of kmem caches complicates
handling of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches correctly.

Enabling init_on_free also guarantees that pages and heap objects are
initialized right after they're freed, so it won't be possible to access
stale data by using a dangling pointer.

As suggested by Michal Hocko, right now we don't let the heap users to
disable initialization for certain allocations.  There's not enough
evidence that doing so can speed up real-life cases, and introducing ways
to opt-out may result in things going out of control.

This patch (of 2):

The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.

This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS.  And it
gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the
boot args.  (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks
where memory forensics is included in their threat models.)

init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap
objects with zeroes.  Initialization is done at allocation time at the
places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed.

init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects
with zeroes upon their deletion.  This helps to ensure sensitive data
doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses.

Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator
returns zeroed memory.  The two exceptions are slab caches with
constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag.  Those are never
zero-initialized to preserve their semantics.

Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults
can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and
CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON.

If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options take
precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is only
applied to unpoisoned allocations.

Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0:

hackbench, init_on_free=1:  +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%)
hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%)

Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1:  +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1:  +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%)

The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline
is within the standard error.

The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory
tagging (e.g.  arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free
hooks to set the tags for heap objects.  With MTE, tagging will have the
same cost as memory initialization.

Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where
in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized.  There are various
arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but
given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are
people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost,
it seems reasonable to include it in this series.

[glider@google.com: v8]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v9]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627130316.254309-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v10]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628093131.199499-2-glider@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-2-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>		[page and dmapool parts
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>]
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Removed the drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c part, which is not in
android-common 4.14 kernel.

Change-Id: I6b5482fcafae89615e1d79879191fb6ce50d56cf
Bug: 138435492
Test: Boot cuttlefish with and without
Test:   CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON/CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
Test: Boot an ARM64 mobile device with and without
Test:   CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON/CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
2019-08-28 15:20:59 +02:00
Kees Cook
dfb686cea7 BACKPORT: security: Implement Clang's stack initialization
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL turns on stack initialization based on
-ftrivial-auto-var-init in Clang builds, which has greater coverage
than CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL.

-ftrivial-auto-var-init Clang option provides trivial initializers for
uninitialized local variables, variable fields and padding.

It has three possible values:
  pattern - uninitialized locals are filled with a fixed pattern
    (mostly 0xAA on 64-bit platforms, see https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604
    for more details, but 0x000000AA for 32-bit pointers) likely to cause
    crashes when uninitialized value is used;
  zero (it's still debated whether this flag makes it to the official
    Clang release) - uninitialized locals are filled with zeroes;
  uninitialized (default) - uninitialized locals are left intact.

This patch uses only the "pattern" mode when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL is
enabled.

Developers have the possibility to opt-out of this feature on a
per-variable basis by using __attribute__((uninitialized)), but such
use should be well justified in comments.

The Android 4.14 backport drops CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT, because Kconfig
is too old to support compiler feature checks.

Change-Id: I9dca079dd015d3cea0446bbdb916e04f4199c626
Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
(cherry picked from commit 709a972efb01efaeb97cad1adc87fe400119c8ab)
Bug: 133428616
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
2019-06-17 19:25:39 +00:00
Kees Cook
0d29c71f48 BACKPORT: security: Create "kernel hardening" config area
Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig
files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options
going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization
options from the gcc-plugins.

The Android backport only adds INIT_STACK_NONE, as GCC plugins are
unavailable in the Android 4.14 tree.

Change-Id: Ic11cb574d2b447e30b0d93977a6707b53744e1cf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9f671e58159adea641f76c56d1f0bbdcb3c524ff)
Bug: 133428616
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
2019-06-17 19:25:31 +00:00