commit ee0ed02ca93ef1ecf8963ad96638795d55af2c14 upstream.
It is possible that unlinked inode enters ext4_setattr() (e.g. if
somebody calls ftruncate(2) on unlinked but still open file). In such
case we should not delete the inode from the orphan list if truncate
fails. Note that this is mostly a theoretical concern as filesystem is
corrupted if we reach this path anyway but let's be consistent in our
orphan handling.
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c2d1b3aae33605a61cbab445d8ae1c708ccd2698 upstream.
Up until now trimming the freespace was done irrespective of what the
arguments of the FITRIM ioctl were. For example fstrim's -o/-l arguments
will be entirely ignored. Fix it by correctly handling those paramter.
This requires breaking if the found freespace extent is after the end of
the passed range as well as completing trim after trimming
fstrim_range::len bytes.
Fixes: 499f377f49f0 ("btrfs: iterate over unused chunk space in FITRIM")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 4e9036042fedaffcd868d7f7aa948756c48c637d ]
To choose whether to pick the GID from the old (16bit) or new (32bit)
field, we should check if the old gid field is set to 0xffff. Mainline
checks the old *UID* field instead - cut'n'paste from the corresponding
code in ufs_get_inode_uid().
Fixes: 252e211e90ce
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 00abf69dd24f4444d185982379c5cc3bb7b6d1fc upstream.
xfstest generic/452 was triggering a "Busy inodes after umount" warning.
ceph was allowing the mount to go read-only without first flushing out
dirty inodes in the cache. Ensure we sync out the filesystem before
allowing a remount to proceed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/39571
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0cbade024ba501313da3b7e5dd2a188a6bc491b5 upstream.
fstests generic/228 reported this failure that fuse fallocate does not
honor what 'ulimit -f' has set.
This adds the necessary inode_newsize_ok() check.
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Fixes: 05ba1f082300 ("fuse: add FALLOCATE operation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.5
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9de5be06d0a89ca97b5ab902694d42dfd2bb77d2 upstream.
Writepage requests were cropped to i_size & 0xffffffff, which meant that
mmaped writes to any file larger than 4G might be silently discarded.
Fix by storing the file size in a properly sized variable (loff_t instead
of size_t).
Reported-by: Antonio SJ Musumeci <trapexit@spawn.link>
Fixes: 6eaf4782eb09 ("fuse: writepages: crop secondary requests")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.13
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b1029c9bc078a6f1515f55dd993b507dcc7e3440 upstream.
If we fail to find a good deviceid while trying to pnfs instead of
propogating an error back fallback to doing IO to the MDS. Currently,
code with fals the IO with EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Fixes: 8d40b0f14846f ("NFS filelayout:call GETDEVICEINFO after pnfs_layout_process completes"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f02f3755dbd14fb935d24b14650fff9ba92243b8 upstream.
stat command with soft mount never return after server is stopped.
When alloc a new client, the state of the client will be set to
NFS4CLNT_LEASE_EXPIRED.
When the server is stopped, the state manager will work, and accord
the state to recover. But the state is NFS4CLNT_LEASE_EXPIRED, it
will drain the slot table and lead other task to wait queue, until
the client recovered. Then the stat command is hung.
When discover server trunking, the client will renew the lease,
but check the client state, it lead the client state corruption.
So, we need to call state manager to recover it when detect server
ip trunking.
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit c54a881d793e3eea2a1b1460c5778b22128821ea which is
commit 05fd5c2c61732152a6bddc318aae62d7e436629b upstream.
Lars writes:
This patch should not be in 4.14-stable because
088aaf17aa79300cab14dbee2569c58cfafd7d6e was for 4.18+.
Now we have a double-free crash in SMB2_read because there are 2
calls to cifs_small_buf_release in the error path.
It was a mistake to backport it this far, so let's revert it.
Reported-by: Lars Persson <lists@bofh.nu>
Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Cc: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6a54b2e002c9d00b398d35724c79f9fe0d9b38fb upstream.
Change strcat to strncpy in the "None" case to fix a buffer overflow
when cinode->oplock is reset to 0 by another thread accessing the same
cinode. It is never valid to append "None" to any other message.
Consolidate multiple writes to cinode->oplock to reduce raciness.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Probst <kernel@probst.it>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ddccb6dbe780d68133191477571cb7c69e17bb8c upstream.
Fix compile error below when using BUFFER_TRACE.
fs/ext4/inode.c: In function ‘ext4_expand_extra_isize’:
fs/ext4/inode.c:5979:19: error: request for member ‘bh’ in something not a structure or union
BUFFER_TRACE(iloc.bh, "get_write_access");
Fixes: c03b45b853f58 ("ext4, project: expand inode extra size if possible")
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 08fc98a4d6424af66eb3ac4e2cedd2fc927ed436 upstream.
The buffer_head (frames[0].bh) and it's corresping page can be
potentially free'd once brelse() is done inside the for loop
but before the for loop exits in dx_release(). It can be free'd
in another context, when the page cache is flushed via
drop_caches_sysctl_handler(). This results into below data abort
when accessing info->indirect_levels in dx_release().
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc17ac3e01e
Call trace:
dx_release+0x70/0x90
ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x2d4/0x300
ext4_readdir+0x244/0x6f8
iterate_dir+0xbc/0x160
SyS_getdents64+0x94/0x174
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 57a0da28ced8707cb9f79f071a016b9d005caf5a upstream.
Unaligned AIO must be serialized because the zeroing of partial blocks
of unaligned AIO can result in data corruption in case it's overlapping
another in flight IO.
Currently we wait for all unwritten extents before we submit unaligned
AIO which protects data in case of unaligned AIO is following overlapping
IO. However if a unaligned AIO is followed by overlapping aligned AIO we
can still end up corrupting data.
To fix this, we must make sure that the unaligned AIO is the only IO in
flight by waiting for unwritten extents conversion not just before the
IO submission, but right after it as well.
This problem can be reproduced by xfstest generic/538
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 592acbf16821288ecdc4192c47e3774a4c48bb64 upstream.
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ec084de929e419e51bcdafaafe567d9e7d0273b7 upstream.
synchronize_rcu() didn't wait for call_rcu() callbacks, so inode wb
switch may not go to the workqueue after synchronize_rcu(). Thus
previous scheduled switches was not finished even flushing the
workqueue, which will cause a NULL pointer dereferenced followed below.
VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of vdd. Self-destruct in 5 seconds. Have a nice day...
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000278
evict+0xb3/0x180
iput+0x1b0/0x230
inode_switch_wbs_work_fn+0x3c0/0x6a0
worker_thread+0x4e/0x490
? process_one_work+0x410/0x410
kthread+0xe6/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x39/0x50
Replace the synchronize_rcu() call with a rcu_barrier() to wait for all
pending callbacks to finish. And inc isw_nr_in_flight after call_rcu()
in inode_switch_wbs() to make more sense.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190429024108.54150-1-jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 50b29d8f033a7c88c5bc011abc2068b1691ab755 upstream.
Instead of removing EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM from s_def_mount_opt as
I assume was intended, all other options were blown away leading to
_ext4_show_options() output being incorrect.
Fixes: 1e381f60dad9 ("ext4: do not allow journal_opts for fs w/o journal")
Signed-off-by: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 310a997fd74de778b9a4848a64be9cda9f18764a upstream.
It is never possible, that number of block groups decreases,
since only online grow is supported.
But after a growing occured, we have to zero inode tables
for just created new block groups.
Fixes: 19c5246d2516 ("ext4: add new online resize interface")
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7bc04c5c2cc467c5b40f2b03ba08da174a0d5fa7 upstream.
When remounting with debug_want_extra_isize, we were not performing the
same checks that we do during a normal mount. That allowed us to set a
value for s_want_extra_isize that reached outside the s_inode_size.
Fixes: e2b911c53584 ("ext4: clean up feature test macros with predicate functions")
Reported-by: syzbot+f584efa0ac7213c226b7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bfc61c36260ca990937539cd648ede3cd749bc10 upstream.
When finding out which inodes have references on a particular extent, done
by backref.c:iterate_extent_inodes(), from the BTRFS_IOC_LOGICAL_INO (both
v1 and v2) ioctl and from scrub we use the transaction join API to grab a
reference on the currently running transaction, since in order to give
accurate results we need to inspect the delayed references of the currently
running transaction.
However, if there is currently no running transaction, the join operation
will create a new transaction. This is inefficient as the transaction will
eventually be committed, doing unnecessary IO and introducing a potential
point of failure that will lead to a transaction abort due to -ENOSPC, as
recently reported [1].
That's because the join, creates the transaction but does not reserve any
space, so when attempting to update the root item of the root passed to
btrfs_join_transaction(), during the transaction commit, we can end up
failling with -ENOSPC. Users of a join operation are supposed to actually
do some filesystem changes and reserve space by some means, which is not
the case of iterate_extent_inodes(), it is a read-only operation for all
contextes from which it is called.
The reported [1] -ENOSPC failure stack trace is the following:
heisenberg kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
heisenberg kernel: BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
heisenberg kernel: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 at fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:136 btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 4.19.0-4-amd64 #1 Debian 4.19.28-2
heisenberg kernel: Hardware name: FUJITSU LIFEBOOK U757/FJNB2A5, BIOS Version 1.21 03/19/2018
heisenberg kernel: RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb5448828bd40 EFLAGS: 00010286
heisenberg kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ed56bccef50 RCX: 0000000000000006
heisenberg kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000092 RDI: ffff8ed6bda166a0
heisenberg kernel: RBP: 00000000ffffffe4 R08: 00000000000003df R09: 0000000000000007
heisenberg kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8ed63396a078
heisenberg kernel: R13: ffff8ed092d7c800 R14: ffff8ed64f5db028 R15: ffff8ed6bd03d068
heisenberg kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ed6bda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
heisenberg kernel: CR2: 00007f46f75f8000 CR3: 0000000310a0a002 CR4: 00000000003606f0
heisenberg kernel: DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
heisenberg kernel: Call Trace:
heisenberg kernel: commit_fs_roots+0x166/0x1d0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xac/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: btrfs_commit_transaction+0x2bd/0x870 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? start_transaction+0x9d/0x3f0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: transaction_kthread+0x147/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x530/0x530 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: kthread+0x112/0x130
heisenberg kernel: ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
heisenberg kernel: ---[ end trace 05de912e30e012d9 ]---
So fix that by using the attach API, which does not create a transaction
when there is currently no running transaction.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/b2a668d7124f1d3e410367f587926f622b3f03a4.camel@scientia.net/
Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 03628cdbc64db6262e50d0357960a4e9562676a1 upstream.
During fiemap, for regular extents (non inline) we need to check if they
are shared and if they are, set the shared bit. Checking if an extent is
shared requires checking the delayed references of the currently running
transaction, since some reference might have not yet hit the extent tree
and be only in the in-memory delayed references.
However we were using a transaction join for this, which creates a new
transaction when there is no transaction currently running. That means
that two more potential failures can happen: creating the transaction and
committing it. Further, if no write activity is currently happening in the
system, and fiemap calls keep being done, we end up creating and
committing transactions that do nothing.
In some extreme cases this can result in the commit of the transaction
created by fiemap to fail with ENOSPC when updating the root item of a
subvolume tree because a join does not reserve any space, leading to a
trace like the following:
heisenberg kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
heisenberg kernel: BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
heisenberg kernel: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 at fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:136 btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 4.19.0-4-amd64 #1 Debian 4.19.28-2
heisenberg kernel: Hardware name: FUJITSU LIFEBOOK U757/FJNB2A5, BIOS Version 1.21 03/19/2018
heisenberg kernel: RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb5448828bd40 EFLAGS: 00010286
heisenberg kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ed56bccef50 RCX: 0000000000000006
heisenberg kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000092 RDI: ffff8ed6bda166a0
heisenberg kernel: RBP: 00000000ffffffe4 R08: 00000000000003df R09: 0000000000000007
heisenberg kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8ed63396a078
heisenberg kernel: R13: ffff8ed092d7c800 R14: ffff8ed64f5db028 R15: ffff8ed6bd03d068
heisenberg kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ed6bda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
heisenberg kernel: CR2: 00007f46f75f8000 CR3: 0000000310a0a002 CR4: 00000000003606f0
heisenberg kernel: DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
heisenberg kernel: Call Trace:
heisenberg kernel: commit_fs_roots+0x166/0x1d0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xac/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: btrfs_commit_transaction+0x2bd/0x870 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? start_transaction+0x9d/0x3f0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: transaction_kthread+0x147/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x530/0x530 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: kthread+0x112/0x130
heisenberg kernel: ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
heisenberg kernel: ---[ end trace 05de912e30e012d9 ]---
Since fiemap (and btrfs_check_shared()) is a read-only operation, do not do
a transaction join to avoid the overhead of creating a new transaction (if
there is currently no running transaction) and introducing a potential
point of failure when the new transaction gets committed, instead use a
transaction attach to grab a handle for the currently running transaction
if any.
Reported-by: Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@scientia.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/b2a668d7124f1d3e410367f587926f622b3f03a4.camel@scientia.net/
Fixes: afce772e87c36c ("btrfs: fix check_shared for fiemap ioctl")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8c380ab4b7b59c0c602743810be1b712514eaebc upstream.
The reference to iloc.bh has been dropped in ext4_mark_iloc_dirty.
However, the reference is dropped again if error occurs during
ext4_handle_dirty_metadata, which may result in use-after-free bugs.
Fixes: fb265c9cb49e("ext4: add ext4_sb_bread() to disambiguate ENOMEM cases")
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5d01196c0428a206f307e9ee5f6842964098ff0 upstream.
In other places in fs/ext4/xattr.c, if e_value_inum is non-zero, the
code ignores the value in e_value_offs. The e_value_offs *should* be
zero, but we shouldn't depend upon it, since it might not be true in a
corrupted/fuzzed file system.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202897
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202877
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 31562b954b60f02acb91b7349dc6432d3f8c3c5f upstream.
The sanity check in mb_find_extent() only checked that returned extent
does not extend past blocksize * 8, however it should not extend past
EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(sb). This can happen when clusters_per_group <
blocksize * 8 and the tail of the bitmap is not properly filled by 1s
which happened e.g. when ancient kernels have grown the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 742b06b5628f2cd23cb51a034cb54dc33c6162c5 upstream.
We hit a BUG at fs/buffer.c:3057 if we detached the nbd device
before unmounting ext4 filesystem.
The typical chain of events leading to the BUG:
jbd2_write_superblock
submit_bh
submit_bh_wbc
BUG_ON(!buffer_mapped(bh));
The block device is removed and all the pages are invalidated. JBD2
was trying to write journal superblock to the block device which is
no longer present.
Fix this by checking the journal superblock's buffer head prior to
submitting.
Reported-by: Eric Ren <renzhen@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e091eab028f9253eac5c04f9141bbc9d170acab3 upstream.
In some cases, ocfs2_iget() reads the data of inode, which has been
deleted for some reason. That will make the system panic. So We should
judge whether this inode has been deleted, and tell the caller that the
inode is a bad inode.
For example, the ocfs2 is used as the backed of nfs, and the client is
nfsv3. This issue can be reproduced by the following steps.
on the nfs server side,
..../patha/pathb
Step 1: The process A was scheduled before calling the function fh_verify.
Step 2: The process B is removing the 'pathb', and just completed the call
to function dput. Then the dentry of 'pathb' has been deleted from the
dcache, and all ancestors have been deleted also. The relationship of
dentry and inode was deleted through the function hlist_del_init. The
following is the call stack.
dentry_iput->hlist_del_init(&dentry->d_u.d_alias)
At this time, the inode is still in the dcache.
Step 3: The process A call the function ocfs2_get_dentry, which get the
inode from dcache. Then the refcount of inode is 1. The following is the
call stack.
nfsd3_proc_getacl->fh_verify->exportfs_decode_fh->fh_to_dentry(ocfs2_get_dentry)
Step 4: Dirty pages are flushed by bdi threads. So the inode of 'patha'
is evicted, and this directory was deleted. But the inode of 'pathb'
can't be evicted, because the refcount of the inode was 1.
Step 5: The process A keep running, and call the function
reconnect_path(in exportfs_decode_fh), which call function
ocfs2_get_parent of ocfs2. Get the block number of parent
directory(patha) by the name of ... Then read the data from disk by the
block number. But this inode has been deleted, so the system panic.
Process A Process B
1. in nfsd3_proc_getacl |
2. | dput
3. fh_to_dentry(ocfs2_get_dentry) |
4. bdi flush dirty cache |
5. ocfs2_iget |
[283465.542049] OCFS2: ERROR (device sdp): ocfs2_validate_inode_block:
Invalid dinode #580640: OCFS2_VALID_FL not set
[283465.545490] Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device sdp): panic forced
after error
[283465.546889] CPU: 5 PID: 12416 Comm: nfsd Tainted: G W
4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.bug28762940v3.x86_64 #2
[283465.548382] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX
Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 09/21/2015
[283465.549657] 0000000000000000 ffff8800a56fb7b8 ffffffff816e839c
ffffffffa0514758
[283465.550392] 000000000008dc20 ffff8800a56fb838 ffffffff816e62d3
0000000000000008
[283465.551056] ffff880000000010 ffff8800a56fb848 ffff8800a56fb7e8
ffff88005df9f000
[283465.551710] Call Trace:
[283465.552516] [<ffffffff816e839c>] dump_stack+0x63/0x81
[283465.553291] [<ffffffff816e62d3>] panic+0xcb/0x21b
[283465.554037] [<ffffffffa04e66b0>] ocfs2_handle_error+0xf0/0xf0 [ocfs2]
[283465.554882] [<ffffffffa04e7737>] __ocfs2_error+0x67/0x70 [ocfs2]
[283465.555768] [<ffffffffa049c0f9>] ocfs2_validate_inode_block+0x229/0x230
[ocfs2]
[283465.556683] [<ffffffffa047bcbc>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x46c/0x7b0 [ocfs2]
[283465.557408] [<ffffffffa049bed0>] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x20/0x20
[ocfs2]
[283465.557973] [<ffffffffa049f0eb>] ocfs2_read_inode_block_full+0x3b/0x60
[ocfs2]
[283465.558525] [<ffffffffa049f5ba>] ocfs2_iget+0x4aa/0x880 [ocfs2]
[283465.559082] [<ffffffffa049146e>] ocfs2_get_parent+0x9e/0x220 [ocfs2]
[283465.559622] [<ffffffff81297c05>] reconnect_path+0xb5/0x300
[283465.560156] [<ffffffff81297f46>] exportfs_decode_fh+0xf6/0x2b0
[283465.560708] [<ffffffffa062faf0>] ? nfsd_proc_getattr+0xa0/0xa0 [nfsd]
[283465.561262] [<ffffffff810a8196>] ? prepare_creds+0x26/0x110
[283465.561932] [<ffffffffa0630860>] fh_verify+0x350/0x660 [nfsd]
[283465.562862] [<ffffffffa0637804>] ? nfsd_cache_lookup+0x44/0x630 [nfsd]
[283465.563697] [<ffffffffa063a8b9>] nfsd3_proc_getattr+0x69/0xf0 [nfsd]
[283465.564510] [<ffffffffa062cf60>] nfsd_dispatch+0xe0/0x290 [nfsd]
[283465.565358] [<ffffffffa05eb892>] ? svc_tcp_adjust_wspace+0x12/0x30
[sunrpc]
[283465.566272] [<ffffffffa05ea652>] svc_process_common+0x412/0x6a0 [sunrpc]
[283465.567155] [<ffffffffa05eaa03>] svc_process+0x123/0x210 [sunrpc]
[283465.568020] [<ffffffffa062c90f>] nfsd+0xff/0x170 [nfsd]
[283465.568962] [<ffffffffa062c810>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x80/0x80 [nfsd]
[283465.570112] [<ffffffff810a622b>] kthread+0xcb/0xf0
[283465.571099] [<ffffffff810a6160>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
[283465.572114] [<ffffffff816f11b8>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
[283465.573156] [<ffffffff810a6160>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1554185919-3010-1-git-send-email-sunny.s.zhang@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Shuning Zhang <sunny.s.zhang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: piaojun <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: "Gang He" <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 05fd5c2c61732152a6bddc318aae62d7e436629b ]
Commit 088aaf17aa79300cab14dbee2569c58cfafd7d6e introduced a leak where
if SMB2_read() returned an error we would return without freeing the
request buffer.
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
[ Upstream commit d6fd0ae25c6495674dc5a41a8d16bc8e0073276d ]
There's a race between close_ctree() and cleaner_kthread().
close_ctree() sets btrfs_fs_closing(), and the cleaner stops when it
sees it set, but this is racy; the cleaner might have already checked
the bit and could be cleaning stuff. In particular, if it deletes unused
block groups, it will create delayed iputs for the free space cache
inodes. As of "btrfs: don't run delayed_iputs in commit", we're no
longer running delayed iputs after a commit. Therefore, if the cleaner
creates more delayed iputs after delayed iputs are run in
btrfs_commit_super(), we will leak inodes on unmount and get a busy
inode crash from the VFS.
Fix it by parking the cleaner before we actually close anything. Then,
any remaining delayed iputs will always be handled in
btrfs_commit_super(). This also ensures that the commit in close_ctree()
is really the last commit, so we can get rid of the commit in
cleaner_kthread().
The fstest/generic/475 followed by 476 can trigger a crash that
manifests as a slab corruption caused by accessing the freed kthread
structure by a wake up function. Sample trace:
[ 5657.077612] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000cc
[ 5657.079432] PGD 1c57a067 P4D 1c57a067 PUD da10067 PMD 0
[ 5657.080661] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 5657.081592] CPU: 1 PID: 5157 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 4.19.0-rc8-default+ #323
[ 5657.083703] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626cc-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[ 5657.086577] RIP: 0010:shrink_page_list+0x2f9/0xe90
[ 5657.091937] RSP: 0018:ffffb5c745c8f728 EFLAGS: 00010287
[ 5657.092953] RAX: 0000000000000074 RBX: ffffb5c745c8f830 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 5657.094590] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff9a8747fdf3d0
[ 5657.095987] RBP: ffffb5c745c8f9e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5657.097159] R10: ffff9a8747fdf5e8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb5c745c8f788
[ 5657.098513] R13: ffff9a877f6ff2c0 R14: ffff9a877f6ff2c8 R15: dead000000000200
[ 5657.099689] FS: 00007f948d853b80(0000) GS:ffff9a877d600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5657.101032] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5657.101953] CR2: 00000000000000cc CR3: 00000000684bd000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 5657.103159] Call Trace:
[ 5657.103776] shrink_inactive_list+0x194/0x410
[ 5657.104671] shrink_node_memcg.constprop.84+0x39a/0x6a0
[ 5657.105750] shrink_node+0x62/0x1c0
[ 5657.106529] try_to_free_pages+0x1a4/0x500
[ 5657.107408] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x2c9/0xb20
[ 5657.108418] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x268/0x2b0
[ 5657.109348] kmalloc_large_node+0x37/0x90
[ 5657.110205] __kmalloc_node+0x236/0x310
[ 5657.111014] kvmalloc_node+0x3e/0x70
Fixes: 30928e9baac2 ("btrfs: don't run delayed_iputs in commit")
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add trace ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
[ Upstream commit 2d84a2d19b6150c6dbac1e6ebad9c82e4c123772 ]
In current fuse_drop_waiting() implementation it's possible that
fuse_wait_aborted() will not be woken up in the unlikely case that
fuse_abort_conn() + fuse_wait_aborted() runs in between checking
fc->connected and calling atomic_dec(&fc->num_waiting).
Do the atomic_dec_and_test() unconditionally, which also provides the
necessary barrier against reordering with the fc->connected check.
The explicit smp_mb() in fuse_wait_aborted() is not actually needed, since
the spin_unlock() in fuse_abort_conn() provides the necessary RELEASE
barrier after resetting fc->connected. However, this is not a performance
sensitive path, and adding the explicit barrier makes it easier to
document.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: b8f95e5d13f5 ("fuse: umount should wait for all requests")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.19
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
commit 998267900cee901c5d1dfa029a6304d00acbc29f upstream.
smp_mb__before_atomic() can not be applied to atomic_set(). Remove the
barrier and rely on RELEASE synchronization.
Fixes: ba16b2846a8c6 ("kernfs: add an API to get kernfs node from inode number")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 58b6e5e8f1addd44583d61b0a03c0f5519527e35 ]
When mknod is used to create a block special file in hugetlbfs, it will
allocate an inode and kmalloc a 'struct resv_map' via resv_map_alloc().
inode->i_mapping->private_data will point the newly allocated resv_map.
However, when the device special file is opened bd_acquire() will set
inode->i_mapping to bd_inode->i_mapping. Thus the pointer to the
allocated resv_map is lost and the structure is leaked.
Programs to reproduce:
mount -t hugetlbfs nodev hugetlbfs
mknod hugetlbfs/dev b 0 0
exec 30<> hugetlbfs/dev
umount hugetlbfs/
resv_map structures are only needed for inodes which can have associated
page allocations. To fix the leak, only allocate resv_map for those
inodes which could possibly be associated with page allocations.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190401213101.16476-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Yufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Yufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 93b919da64c15b90953f96a536e5e61df896ca57 ]
symlink body shouldn't be freed without an RCU delay. Switch debugfs to
->destroy_inode() and use of call_rcu(); free both the inode and symlink
body in the callback. Similar to solution for bpf, only here it's even
more obvious that ->evict_inode() can be dropped.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4fdcfab5b5537c21891e22e65996d4d0dd8ab4ca ]
free the symlink body after the same RCU delay we have for freeing the
struct inode itself, so that traversal during RCU pathwalk wouldn't step
into freed memory.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit daf5cc27eed99afdea8d96e71b89ba41f5406ef6 ]
free the symlink body after the same RCU delay we have for freeing the
struct inode itself, so that traversal during RCU pathwalk wouldn't step
into freed memory.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5a698243930c441afccec04e4d5dc8febfd2b775 ]
Specifying a retrans=0 mount parameter to a NFS/TCP mount, is
inadvertently causing the NFS client to rewrite any specified
timeout parameter to the default of 60 seconds.
Fixes: a956beda19a6 ("NFS: Allow the mount option retrans=0")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 15fab63e1e57be9fdb5eec1bbc5916e9825e9acb upstream.
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7c2bd9a39845bfb6d72ddb55ce737650271f6f96 upstream.
syzbot is reporting uninitialized value at rpc_sockaddr2uaddr() [1]. This
is because syzbot is setting AF_INET6 to "struct sockaddr_in"->sin_family
(which is embedded into user-visible "struct nfs_mount_data" structure)
despite nfs23_validate_mount_data() cannot pass sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)
bytes of AF_INET6 address to rpc_sockaddr2uaddr().
Since "struct nfs_mount_data" structure is user-visible, we can't change
"struct nfs_mount_data" to use "struct sockaddr_storage". Therefore,
assuming that everybody is using AF_INET family when passing address via
"struct nfs_mount_data"->addr, reject if its sin_family is not AF_INET.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=599993614e7cbbf66bc2656a919ab2a95fb5d75c
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+047a11c361b872896a4f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e6abc8caa6deb14be2a206253f7e1c5e37e9515b upstream.
If there are multiple callbacks queued, waiting for the callback
slot when the callback gets shut down, then they all currently
end up acting as if they hold the slot, and call
nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() resulting in interesting side-effects.
In addition, the 'retry_nowait' path in nfsd4_cb_sequence_done()
causes a loop back to nfsd4_cb_prepare() without first freeing the
slot, which causes a deadlock when nfsd41_cb_get_slot() gets called
a second time.
This patch therefore adds a boolean to track whether or not the
callback did pick up the slot, so that it can do the right thing
in these 2 cases.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 37659182bff1eeaaeadcfc8f853c6d2b6dbc3f47 upstream.
We missed two places that i_wrbuffer_ref_head, i_wr_ref, i_dirty_caps
and i_flushing_caps may change. When they are all zeros, we should free
i_head_snapc.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/38224
Reported-and-tested-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1bcb344086f3ecf8d6705f6d708441baa823beb3 upstream.
Ben reported tripping the BUG_ON in create_request_message during some
performance testing. Analysis of the vmcore showed that the length of
the r_dentry->d_name string changed after we allocated the buffer, but
before we encoded it.
build_dentry_path returns pointers to d_name in the common case of
non-snapped dentries, but this optimization isn't safe unless the parent
directory is locked. When it isn't, have the code make a copy of the
d_name while holding the d_lock.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben England <bengland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b987222654f84f7b4ca95b3a55eca784cb30235b upstream.
This fixes multiple issues in buffer_pipe_buf_ops:
- The ->steal() handler must not return zero unless the pipe buffer has
the only reference to the page. But generic_pipe_buf_steal() assumes
that every reference to the pipe is tracked by the page's refcount,
which isn't true for these buffers - buffer_pipe_buf_get(), which
duplicates a buffer, doesn't touch the page's refcount.
Fix it by using generic_pipe_buf_nosteal(), which refuses every
attempted theft. It should be easy to actually support ->steal, but the
only current users of pipe_buf_steal() are the virtio console and FUSE,
and they also only use it as an optimization. So it's probably not worth
the effort.
- The ->get() and ->release() handlers can be invoked concurrently on pipe
buffers backed by the same struct buffer_ref. Make them safe against
concurrency by using refcount_t.
- The pointers stored in ->private were only zeroed out when the last
reference to the buffer_ref was dropped. As far as I know, this
shouldn't be necessary anyway, but if we do it, let's always do it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190404215925.253531-1-jannh@google.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 73a757e63114d ("ring-buffer: Return reader page back into existing ring buffer")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 652727bbe1b17993636346716ae5867627793647 upstream.
A path-based rename returning EBUSY will incorrectly try opening
the file with a cifs (NT Create AndX) operation on an smb2+ mount,
which causes the server to force a session close.
If the mount is smb2+, skip the fallback.
Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6e643cd094de3bd0f97edcc1db0089afa24d909f upstream.
The new attribute leaf buffer is not held locked across the transaction
roll between the shortform->leaf modification and the addition of the
new entry. As a result, the attribute buffer modification being made is
not atomic from an operational perspective. Hence the AIL push can grab
it in the transient state of "just created" after the initial
transaction is rolled, because the buffer has been released. This leads
to xfs_attr3_leaf_verify() asserting that hdr.count is zero, treating
this as in-memory corruption, and shutting down the filesystem.
Darrick ported the original patch to 4.15 and reworked it use the
xfs_defer_bjoin helper and hold/join the buffer correctly across the
second transaction roll.
Signed-off-by: Alex Lyakas <alex@zadarastorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Lyakas <alex@zadara.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b7b2846fe26f2c0d7f317c874a13d3ecf22670ff upstream.
In certain cases, defer_ops callers will lock a buffer and want to hold
the lock across transaction rolls. Similar to ijoined inodes, we want
to dirty & join the buffer with each transaction roll in defer_finish so
that afterwards the caller still owns the buffer lock and we haven't
inadvertently pinned the log.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Lyakas <alex@zadara.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5a9d929d6e13278df62bd9e3d3ceae8c87ad1eea upstream.
If two programs simultaneously try to write to the same part of a file
via direct IO and buffered IO, there's a chance that the post-diowrite
pagecache invalidation will fail on the dirty page. When this happens,
the dio write succeeded, which means that the page cache is no longer
coherent with the disk!
Programs are not supposed to mix IO types and this is a clear case of
data corruption, so store an EIO which will be reflected to userspace
during the next fsync. Replace the WARN_ON with a ratelimited pr_crit
so that the developers have /some/ kind of breadcrumb to track down the
offending program(s) and file(s) involved.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
commit 04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a upstream.
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b98749cac4a695f084a5ff076f4510b23e353ecd upstream.
In the oplock break handler, writing pending changes from pages puts
the FileInfo handle. If the refcount reaches zero it closes the handle
and waits for any oplock break handler to return, thus causing a deadlock.
To prevent this situation:
* We add a wait flag to cifsFileInfo_put() to decide whether we should
wait for running/pending oplock break handlers
* We keep an additionnal reference of the SMB FileInfo handle so that
for the rest of the handler putting the handle won't close it.
- The ref is bumped everytime we queue the handler via the
cifs_queue_oplock_break() helper.
- The ref is decremented at the end of the handler
This bug was triggered by xfstest 464.
Also important fix to address the various reports of
oops in smb2_push_mandatory_locks
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 3b7960caceafdfc2cdfe2850487f8d091eb41144 ]
In cases where queryinfo fails, we have cases in cifs (vers=1.0)
where with backupuid mounts we retry the query info with findfirst.
This doesn't work to some NetApp servers which don't support
WindowsXP (and later) infolevel 261 (SMB_FIND_FILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO)
so in this case use other info levels (in this case it will usually
be level 257, SMB_FIND_FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO).
(Also fixes some indentation)
See kernel bugzilla 201435
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
