commit f247f0a82a4f8c3bfed178d8fd9e069d1424ee4e upstream.
If ucsi_init() fails for some reason (e.g. ucsi_register_port()
fails or general communication failure to the PPM), particularly at
any point after the GET_CAPABILITY command had been issued, this
results in unwinding the initialization and returning an error.
However the ucsi structure's ucsi_capability member retains its
current value, including likely a non-zero num_connectors.
And because ucsi_init() itself is done in a workqueue a UCSI
interface driver will be unaware that it failed and may think the
ucsi_register() call was completely successful. Later, if
ucsi_unregister() is called, due to this stale ucsi->cap value it
would try to access the items in the ucsi->connector array which
might not be in a proper state or not even allocated at all and
results in NULL or invalid pointer dereference.
Fix this by clearing the ucsi->cap value to 0 during the error
path of ucsi_init() in order to prevent a later ucsi_unregister()
from entering the connector cleanup loop.
Fixes: c1b0bc2dabfa ("usb: typec: Add support for UCSI interface")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mayank Rana <mrana@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Jack Pham <jackp@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210609073535.5094-1-jackp@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d00889080ab60051627dab1d85831cd9db750e2a upstream.
There is no validation of the index from dwc3_wIndex_to_dep() and we might
be referring a non-existing ep and trigger a NULL pointer exception. In
certain configurations we might use fewer eps and the index might wrongly
indicate a larger ep index than existing.
By adding this validation from the patch we can actually report a wrong
index back to the caller.
In our usecase we are using a composite device on an older kernel, but
upstream might use this fix also. Unfortunately, I cannot describe the
hardware for others to reproduce the issue as it is a proprietary
implementation.
[ 82.958261] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a4
[ 82.966891] Mem abort info:
[ 82.969663] ESR = 0x96000006
[ 82.972703] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 82.978603] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 82.981642] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 82.984765] Data abort info:
[ 82.987631] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006
[ 82.991449] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 82.994409] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000c6210ccc
[ 83.000999] [00000000000000a4] pgd=0000000053aa5003, pud=0000000053aa5003, pmd=0000000000000000
[ 83.009685] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 83.026433] Process irq/62-dwc3 (pid: 303, stack limit = 0x000000003985154c)
[ 83.033470] CPU: 0 PID: 303 Comm: irq/62-dwc3 Not tainted 4.19.124 #1
[ 83.044836] pstate: 60000085 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO)
[ 83.049628] pc : dwc3_ep0_handle_feature+0x414/0x43c
[ 83.054558] lr : dwc3_ep0_interrupt+0x3b4/0xc94
...
[ 83.141788] Call trace:
[ 83.144227] dwc3_ep0_handle_feature+0x414/0x43c
[ 83.148823] dwc3_ep0_interrupt+0x3b4/0xc94
[ 83.181546] ---[ end trace aac6b5267d84c32f ]---
Signed-off-by: Marian-Cristian Rotariu <marian.c.rotariu@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210608162650.58426-1-marian.c.rotariu@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e7b2ec3d3d4ebeb4cff7ae45cf430182fa6a49fb upstream.
We always return 0 even in case of an error in btrfs_mark_extent_written().
Fix it to return proper error value in case of a failure. All callers
handle it.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit da27a83fd6cc7780fea190e1f5c19e87019da65c upstream.
KVM's mechanism for accessing guest memory translates a guest physical
address (gpa) to a host virtual address using the right-shifted gpa
(also known as gfn) and a struct kvm_memory_slot. The translation is
performed in __gfn_to_hva_memslot using the following formula:
hva = slot->userspace_addr + (gfn - slot->base_gfn) * PAGE_SIZE
It is expected that gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory. However, a guest can access invalid physical addresses
in such a way that the gfn is invalid.
__gfn_to_hva_memslot is called from kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot, which first
retrieves a memslot through __gfn_to_memslot. While __gfn_to_memslot
does check that the gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory or not, a CPU can speculate the result of the check and
continue execution speculatively using an illegal gfn. The speculation
can result in calculating an out-of-bounds hva. If the resulting host
virtual address is used to load another guest physical address, this
is effectively a Spectre gadget consisting of two consecutive reads,
the second of which is data dependent on the first.
Right now it's not clear if there are any cases in which this is
exploitable. One interesting case was reported by the original author
of this patch, and involves visiting guest page tables on x86. Right
now these are not vulnerable because the hva read goes through get_user(),
which contains an LFENCE speculation barrier. However, there are
patches in progress for x86 uaccess.h to mask kernel addresses instead of
using LFENCE; once these land, a guest could use speculation to read
from the VMM's ring 3 address space. Other architectures such as ARM
already use the address masking method, and would be susceptible to
this same kind of data-dependent access gadgets. Therefore, this patch
proactively protects from these attacks by masking out-of-bounds gfns
in __gfn_to_hva_memslot, which blocks speculation of invalid hvas.
Sean Christopherson noted that this patch does not cover
kvm_read_guest_offset_cached. This however is limited to a few bytes
past the end of the cache, and therefore it is unlikely to be useful in
the context of building a chain of data dependent accesses.
Reported-by: Artemiy Margaritov <artemiy.margaritov@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Artemiy Margaritov <artemiy.margaritov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c336a5ee984708db4826ef9e47d184e638e29717 upstream.
This patch eliminates the following smatch warning:
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c:320 drm_master_release() warn: unlocked access 'master' (line 318) expected lock '&dev->master_mutex'
The 'file_priv->master' field should be protected by the mutex lock to
'&dev->master_mutex'. This is because other processes can concurrently
modify this field and free the current 'file_priv->master'
pointer. This could result in a use-after-free error when 'master' is
dereferenced in subsequent function calls to
'drm_legacy_lock_master_cleanup()' or to 'drm_lease_revoke()'.
An example of a scenario that would produce this error can be seen
from a similar bug in 'drm_getunique()' that was reported by Syzbot:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=148d2f1dfac64af52ffd27b661981a540724f803
In the Syzbot report, another process concurrently acquired the
device's master mutex in 'drm_setmaster_ioctl()', then overwrote
'fpriv->master' in 'drm_new_set_master()'. The old value of
'fpriv->master' was subsequently freed before the mutex was unlocked.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210609092119.173590-1-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b436acd1cf7fac0ba987abd22955d98025c80c2b upstream.
There is a time-of-check-to-time-of-use error in drm_getunique() due
to retrieving file_priv->master prior to locking the device's master
mutex.
An example can be seen in the crash report of the use-after-free error
found by Syzbot:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=148d2f1dfac64af52ffd27b661981a540724f803
In the report, the master pointer was used after being freed. This is
because another process had acquired the device's master mutex in
drm_setmaster_ioctl(), then overwrote fpriv->master in
drm_new_set_master(). The old value of fpriv->master was subsequently
freed before the mutex was unlocked.
To fix this, we lock the device's master mutex before retrieving the
pointer from from fpriv->master. This patch passes the Syzbot
reproducer test.
Reported-by: syzbot+c3a706cec1ea99e1c693@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210608110436.239583-1-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 8f0cdec8b5fd94135d643662506ee94ae9e98785 ]
The P2040/P2041 has an erratum where the normal i2c recovery mechanism
does not work. Implement the alternative recovery mechanism documented
in the P2040 Chip Errata Rev Q.
Signed-off-by: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 65171b2df15eb7545431d75c2729b5062da89b43 ]
Move the existing calls of mpc_i2c_fixup() to a recovery function
registered via bus_recovery_info. This makes it more obvious that
recovery is supported and allows for a future where recovery is
triggered by the i2c core.
Signed-off-by: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 19ae697a1e4edf1d755b413e3aa38da65e2db23b ]
The i2c controllers on the P1010 have an erratum where the documented
scheme for i2c bus recovery will not work (A-004447). A different
mechanism is needed which is documented in the P1010 Chip Errata Rev L.
Signed-off-by: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7adc7b225cddcfd0f346d10144fd7a3d3d9f9ea7 ]
The i2c controllers on the P2040/P2041 have an erratum where the
documented scheme for i2c bus recovery will not work (A-004447). A
different mechanism is needed which is documented in the P2040 Chip
Errata Rev Q (latest available at the time of writing).
Signed-off-by: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 78cf0eb926cb1abeff2106bae67752e032fe5f3e ]
When update the latest mainline kernel with the following three configs,
the kernel hangs during startup:
(1) CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER=y
(2) CONFIG_PREEMPT_TRACER=y
(3) CONFIG_FTRACE_STARTUP_TEST=y
When update the latest mainline kernel with the above two configs (1)
and (2), the kernel starts normally, but it still hangs when execute
the following command:
echo "function_graph" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer
Without CONFIG_PREEMPT_TRACER=y, the above two kinds of kernel hangs
disappeared, so it seems that CONFIG_PREEMPT_TRACER has some influences
with function_graph tracer at the first glance.
I use ejtag to find out the epc address is related with preempt_enable()
in the file arch/mips/lib/mips-atomic.c, because function tracing can
trace the preempt_{enable,disable} calls that are traced, replace them
with preempt_{enable,disable}_notrace to prevent function tracing from
going into an infinite loop, and then it can fix the kernel hang issue.
By the way, it seems that this commit is a complement and improvement of
commit f93a1a00f2bd ("MIPS: Fix crash that occurs when function tracing
is enabled").
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a4dd4fc6105e54393d637450a11d4cddb5fabc4f ]
In cops_probe1(), there is a write to dev->base_addr after requesting an
interrupt line and registering the interrupt handler cops_interrupt().
The handler might be called in parallel to handle an interrupt.
cops_interrupt() tries to read dev->base_addr leading to a potential
data race. So write to dev->base_addr before calling request_irq().
Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Signed-off-by: Saubhik Mukherjee <saubhik.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5eff1461a6dec84f04fafa9128548bad51d96147 ]
If runtime power menagement is enabled, the gigabit ethernet PLL would
be disabled after macb_probe(). During this period of time, the system
would hang up if we try to access GEMGXL control registers.
We can't put runtime_pm_get/runtime_pm_put/ there due to the issue of
sleep inside atomic section (7fa2955ff70ce453 ("sh_eth: Fix sleeping
function called from invalid context"). Add netif_running checking to
ensure the device is available before accessing GEMGXL device.
Changed in v2:
- Use netif_running instead of its own flag
Signed-off-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2ef7665dfd88830f15415ba007c7c9a46be7acd8 ]
Target de-configuration panics at high CPU load because TPGT and WWPN can
be removed on separate threads.
TPGT removal requests a reset HBA on a separate thread and waits for reset
complete (phase1). Due to high CPU load that HBA reset can be delayed for
some time.
WWPN removal does qlt_stop_phase2(). There it is believed that phase1 has
already completed and thus tgt.tgt_ops is subsequently cleared. However,
tgt.tgt_ops is needed to process incoming traffic and therefore this will
cause one of the following panics:
NIP qlt_reset+0x7c/0x220 [qla2xxx]
LR qlt_reset+0x68/0x220 [qla2xxx]
Call Trace:
0xc000003ffff63a78 (unreliable)
qlt_handle_imm_notify+0x800/0x10c0 [qla2xxx]
qlt_24xx_atio_pkt+0x208/0x590 [qla2xxx]
qlt_24xx_process_atio_queue+0x33c/0x7a0 [qla2xxx]
qla83xx_msix_atio_q+0x54/0x90 [qla2xxx]
or
NIP qlt_24xx_handle_abts+0xd0/0x2a0 [qla2xxx]
LR qlt_24xx_handle_abts+0xb4/0x2a0 [qla2xxx]
Call Trace:
qlt_24xx_handle_abts+0x90/0x2a0 [qla2xxx] (unreliable)
qlt_24xx_process_atio_queue+0x500/0x7a0 [qla2xxx]
qla83xx_msix_atio_q+0x54/0x90 [qla2xxx]
or
NIP qlt_create_sess+0x90/0x4e0 [qla2xxx]
LR qla24xx_do_nack_work+0xa8/0x180 [qla2xxx]
Call Trace:
0xc0000000348fba30 (unreliable)
qla24xx_do_nack_work+0xa8/0x180 [qla2xxx]
qla2x00_do_work+0x674/0xbf0 [qla2xxx]
qla2x00_iocb_work_fn
The patch fixes the issue by serializing qlt_stop_phase1() and
qlt_stop_phase2() functions to make WWPN removal wait for phase1
completion.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210415203554.27890-1-d.bogdanov@yadro.com
Reviewed-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <d.bogdanov@yadro.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 940d71c6462e8151c78f28e4919aa8882ff2054e ]
If VCPU is suspended (VM suspend) in wq_watchdog_timer_fn() then
once this VCPU resumes it will see the new jiffies value, while it
may take a while before IRQ detects PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED on this
VCPU and updates all the watchdogs via pvclock_touch_watchdogs().
There is a small chance of misreported WQ stalls in the meantime,
because new jiffies is time_after() old 'ts + thresh'.
wq_watchdog_timer_fn()
{
for_each_pool(pool, pi) {
if (time_after(jiffies, ts + thresh)) {
pr_emerg("BUG: workqueue lockup - pool");
}
}
}
Save jiffies at the beginning of this function and use that value
for stall detection. If VM gets suspended then we continue using
"old" jiffies value and old WQ touch timestamps. If IRQ at some
point restarts the stall detection cycle (pvclock_touch_watchdogs())
then old jiffies will always be before new 'ts + thresh'.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 45e1ba40837ac2f6f4d4716bddb8d44bd7e4a251 ]
This patch effectively reverts the commit a3e72739b7a7 ("cgroup: fix
too early usage of static_branch_disable()"). The commit 6041186a3258
("init: initialize jump labels before command line option parsing") has
moved the jump_label_init() before parse_args() which has made the
commit a3e72739b7a7 unnecessary. On the other hand there are
consequences of disabling the controllers later as there are subsystems
doing the controller checks for different decisions. One such incident
is reported [1] regarding the memory controller and its impact on memory
reclaim code.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/921e53f3-4b13-aab8-4a9e-e83ff15371e4@nec.com
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Reported-by: NOMURA JUNICHI(野村 淳一) <junichi.nomura@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jun'ichi Nomura <junichi.nomura@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1dde47a66d4fb181830d6fa000e5ea86907b639e ]
We spotted a bug recently during a review where a driver was
unregistering a bus that wasn't registered, which would trigger this
BUG_ON(). Let's handle that situation more gracefully, and just print
a warning and return.
Reported-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1d482e666b8e74c7555dbdfbfb77205eeed3ff2d ]
Syzbot reports that in mac80211 we have a potential deadlock
between our "local->stop_queue_reasons_lock" (spinlock) and
netlink's nl_table_lock (rwlock). This is because there's at
least one situation in which we might try to send a netlink
message with this spinlock held while it is also possible to
take the spinlock from a hardirq context, resulting in the
following deadlock scenario reported by lockdep:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(nl_table_lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock);
lock(nl_table_lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock);
This seems valid, we can take the queue_stop_reason_lock in
any kind of context ("CPU0"), and call ieee80211_report_ack_skb()
with the spinlock held and IRQs disabled ("CPU1") in some
code path (ieee80211_do_stop() via ieee80211_free_txskb()).
Short of disallowing netlink use in scenarios like these
(which would be rather complex in mac80211's case due to
the deep callchain), it seems the only fix for this is to
disable IRQs while nl_table_lock is held to avoid hitting
this scenario, this disallows the "CPU0" portion of the
reported deadlock.
Note that the writer side (netlink_table_grab()) already
disables IRQs for this lock.
Unfortunately though, this seems like a huge hammer, and
maybe the whole netlink table locking should be reworked.
Reported-by: syzbot+69ff9dff50dcfe14ddd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 35d96e631860226d5dc4de0fad0a415362ec2457 ]
If bond_kobj_init() or later kzalloc() in bond_alloc_slave() fail,
then we call kobject_put() on the slave->kobj. This in turn calls
the release function slave_kobj_release() which will always try to
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&slave->notify_work), which shouldn't be
done on an uninitialized work struct.
Always initialize the work struct earlier to avoid problems here.
Syzbot bisected this down to a completely pointless commit, some
fault injection may have been at work here that caused the alloc
failure in the first place, which may interact badly with bisect.
Reported-by: syzbot+bfda097c12a00c8cae67@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e072b2671606c77538d6a4dd5dda80b508cb4816 ]
This patch adds missing MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE definition which generates
correct modalias for automatic loading of this driver when it is built
as an external module.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zou Wei <zou_wei@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1620789145-14936-1-git-send-email-zou_wei@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8ab78863e9eff11910e1ac8bcf478060c29b379e ]
The function rawsock_create() calls a privileged function sk_alloc(), which requires a ns-aware check to check net->user_ns, i.e., ns_capable(). However, the original code checks the init_user_ns using capable(). So we replace the capable() with ns_capable().
Signed-off-by: Jeimon <jjjinmeng.zhou@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 591a22c14d3f45cc38bd1931c593c221df2f1881 upstream.
Commit bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of
a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure
the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more
privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread
(during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener
and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files
already do, though for different reasons.)
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Fixes: bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The commit referenced below was incomplete: It merely affected what
would get written to the vdev-<N> xenstore node. The guest would still
find the function at the original function number as long as
__xen_pcibk_get_pci_dev() wouldn't be in sync. The same goes for AER wrt
__xen_pcibk_get_pcifront_dev().
Undo overriding the function to zero and instead make sure that VFs at
function zero remain alone in their slot. This has the added benefit of
improving overall capacity, considering that there's only a total of 32
slots available right now (PCI segment and bus can both only ever be
zero at present).
This is upstream commit 4ba50e7c423c29639878c00573288869aa627068.
Fixes: 8a5248fe10b1 ("xen PV passthru: assign SR-IOV virtual functions to
separate virtual slots")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8def783b-404c-3452-196d-3f3fd4d72c9e@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 60588bfa223ff675b95f866249f90616613fbe31 upstream.
select_idle_cpu() will scan the LLC domain for idle CPUs,
it's always expensive. so the next commit :
1ad3aaf3fcd2 ("sched/core: Implement new approach to scale select_idle_cpu()")
introduces a way to limit how many CPUs we scan.
But it consume some CPUs out of 'nr' that are not allowed
for the task and thus waste our attempts. The function
always return nr_cpumask_bits, and we can't find a CPU
which our task is allowed to run.
Cpumask may be too big, similar to select_idle_core(), use
per_cpu_ptr 'select_idle_mask' to prevent stack overflow.
Fixes: 1ad3aaf3fcd2 ("sched/core: Implement new approach to scale select_idle_cpu()")
Signed-off-by: Cheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191213024530.28052-1-cj.chengjian@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Wei <yang.wei@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Yang Wei <yang.wei@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0884335a2e653b8a045083aa1d57ce74269ac81d upstream.
Drop bits 63:32 on loads/stores to/from DRs and CRs when the vCPU is not
in 64-bit mode. The APM states bits 63:32 are dropped for both DRs and
CRs:
In 64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 64 bits without the need
for a REX prefix. In non-64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 32
bits and the upper 32 bits of the destination are forced to 0.
Fixes: 7ff76d58a9dc ("KVM: SVM: enhance MOV CR intercept handler")
Fixes: cae3797a4639 ("KVM: SVM: enhance mov DR intercept handler")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210422022128.3464144-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[sudip: manual backport to old file]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1d86859fdf31a0d50cc82b5d0d6bfb5fe98f6c00 upstream.
The dev_port is meant to distinguish the network ports belonging to
the same PCI function. Our devices only have one network port
associated with each PCI function and so we should not set it for
correctness.
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a7036191277f9fa68d92f2071ddc38c09b1e5ee5 upstream.
In 801c6058d14a ("bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under
speculation") we replaced masking logic with direct loads of immediates
if the register is a known constant. Given in this case we do not apply
any masking, there is also no reason for the operation to be truncated
under the speculative domain.
Therefore, there is also zero reason for the verifier to branch-off and
simulate this case, it only needs to do it for unknown but bounded scalars.
As a side-effect, this also enables few test cases that were previously
rejected due to simulation under zero truncation.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bb01a1bba579b4b1c5566af24d95f1767859771e upstream.
Masking direction as indicated via mask_to_left is considered to be
calculated once and then used to derive pointer limits. Thus, this
needs to be placed into bpf_sanitize_info instead so we can pass it
to sanitize_ptr_alu() call after the pointer move. Piotr noticed a
corner case where the off reg causes masking direction change which
then results in an incorrect final aux->alu_limit.
Fixes: 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask")
Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3d0220f6861d713213b015b582e9f21e5b28d2e0 upstream.
Add a container structure struct bpf_sanitize_info which holds
the current aux info, and update call-sites to sanitize_ptr_alu()
to pass it in. This is needed for passing in additional state
later on.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 801c6058d14a82179a7ee17a4b532cac6fad067f upstream.
The current implemented mechanisms to mitigate data disclosure under
speculation mainly address stack and map value oob access from the
speculative domain. However, Piotr discovered that uninitialized BPF
stack is not protected yet, and thus old data from the kernel stack,
potentially including addresses of kernel structures, could still be
extracted from that 512 bytes large window. The BPF stack is special
compared to map values since it's not zero initialized for every
program invocation, whereas map values /are/ zero initialized upon
their initial allocation and thus cannot leak any prior data in either
domain. In the non-speculative domain, the verifier ensures that every
stack slot read must have a prior stack slot write by the BPF program
to avoid such data leaking issue.
However, this is not enough: for example, when the pointer arithmetic
operation moves the stack pointer from the last valid stack offset to
the first valid offset, the sanitation logic allows for any intermediate
offsets during speculative execution, which could then be used to
extract any restricted stack content via side-channel.
Given for unprivileged stack pointer arithmetic the use of unknown
but bounded scalars is generally forbidden, we can simply turn the
register-based arithmetic operation into an immediate-based arithmetic
operation without the need for masking. This also gives the benefit
of reducing the needed instructions for the operation. Given after
the work in 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic
mask"), the aux->alu_limit already holds the final immediate value for
the offset register with the known scalar. Thus, a simple mov of the
immediate to AX register with using AX as the source for the original
instruction is sufficient and possible now in this case.
Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: fixed minor 4.14 conflict because of renamed function]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 31e95b61e172144bb2b626a291db1bdc0769275b upstream.
mostly revert the previous workaround and make
'dubious pointer arithmetic' test useful again.
Use (ptr - ptr) << const instead of ptr << const to generate large scalar.
The rest stays as before commit 2b36047e7889.
Fixes: 2b36047e7889 ("selftests/bpf: fix test_align")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
[fllinden@amazon.com: adjust for 4.14 (no liveness of regs in output)]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2b36047e7889b7efee22c11e17f035f721855731 upstream.
since commit 82abbf8d2fc4 the verifier rejects the bit-wise
arithmetic on pointers earlier.
The test 'dubious pointer arithmetic' now has less output to match on.
Adjust it.
Fixes: 82abbf8d2fc4 ("bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dd066823db2ac4e22f721ec85190817b58059a54 upstream.
Subtraction of pointers was accidentally allowed for unpriv programs
by commit 82abbf8d2fc4. Revert that part of commit.
Fixes: 82abbf8d2fc4 ("bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 82abbf8d2fc46d79611ab58daa7c608df14bb3ee upstream.
Do not allow root to convert valid pointers into unknown scalars.
In particular disallow:
ptr &= reg
ptr <<= reg
ptr += ptr
and explicitly allow:
ptr -= ptr
since pkt_end - pkt == length
1.
This minimizes amount of address leaks root can do.
In the future may need to further tighten the leaks with kptr_restrict.
2.
If program has such pointer math it's likely a user mistake and
when verifier complains about it right away instead of many instructions
later on invalid memory access it's easier for users to fix their progs.
3.
when register holding a pointer cannot change to scalar it allows JITs to
optimize better. Like 32-bit archs could use single register for pointers
instead of a pair required to hold 64-bit scalars.
4.
reduces architecture dependent behavior. Since code:
r1 = r10;
r1 &= 0xff;
if (r1 ...)
will behave differently arm64 vs x64 and offloaded vs native.
A significant chunk of ptr mangling was allowed by
commit f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
yet some of it was allowed even earlier.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d7a5091351756d0ae8e63134313c455624e36a13 upstream.
Update various selftest error messages:
* The 'Rx tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types'
is reworked into more specific/differentiated error messages for better
guidance.
* The change into 'value -4294967168 makes map_value pointer be out of
bounds' is due to moving the mixed bounds check into the speculation
handling and thus occuring slightly later than above mentioned sanity
check.
* The change into 'math between map_value pointer and register with
unbounded min value' is similarly due to register sanity check coming
before the mixed bounds check.
* The case of 'map access: known scalar += value_ptr from different maps'
now loads fine given masks are the same from the different paths (despite
max map value size being different).
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com - 4.14 backport, account for split test_verifier and
different / missing tests]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7fedb63a8307dda0ec3b8969a3b233a1dd7ea8e0 upstream.
This work tightens the offset mask we use for unprivileged pointer arithmetic
in order to mitigate a corner case reported by Piotr and Benedict where in
the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value
pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-bounds in order to leak kernel memory
via side-channel to user space.
Before this change, the computed ptr_limit for retrieve_ptr_limit() helper
represents largest valid distance when moving pointer to the right or left
which is then fed as aux->alu_limit to generate masking instructions against
the offset register. After the change, the derived aux->alu_limit represents
the largest potential value of the offset register which we mask against which
is just a narrower subset of the former limit.
For minimal complexity, we call sanitize_ptr_alu() from 2 observation points
in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), that is, before and after the simulated alu
operation. In the first step, we retieve the alu_state and alu_limit before
the operation as well as we branch-off a verifier path and push it to the
verification stack as we did before which checks the dst_reg under truncation,
in other words, when the speculative domain would attempt to move the pointer
out-of-bounds.
In the second step, we retrieve the new alu_limit and calculate the absolute
distance between both. Moreover, we commit the alu_state and final alu_limit
via update_alu_sanitation_state() to the env's instruction aux data, and bail
out from there if there is a mismatch due to coming from different verification
paths with different states.
Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f528819334881fd622fdadeddb3f7edaed8b7c9b upstream.
Add a small sanitize_needed() helper function and move sanitize_val_alu()
out of the main opcode switch. In upcoming work, we'll move sanitize_ptr_alu()
as well out of its opcode switch so this helps to streamline both.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 073815b756c51ba9d8384d924c5d1c03ca3d1ae4 upstream.
Move the bounds check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() into a small helper named
sanitize_check_bounds() in order to simplify the former a bit.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a6aaece00a57fa6f22575364b3903dfbccf5345d upstream.
Consolidate all error handling and provide more user-friendly error messages
from sanitize_ptr_alu() and sanitize_val_alu().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b658bbb844e28f1862867f37e8ca11a8e2aa94a3 upstream.
Small refactor with no semantic changes in order to consolidate the max
ptr_limit boundary check.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 24c109bb1537c12c02aeed2d51a347b4d6a9b76e upstream.
The mixed signed bounds check really belongs into retrieve_ptr_limit()
instead of outside of it in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(). The reason is
that this check is not tied to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE only, but to all pointer
types that we handle in retrieve_ptr_limit() and given errors from the latter
propagate back to adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() and lead to rejection of the
program, it's a better place to reside to avoid anything slipping through
for future types. The reason why we must reject such off_reg is that we
otherwise would not be able to derive a mask, see details in 9d7eceede769
("bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6f55b2f2a1178856c19bbce2f71449926e731914 upstream.
Small refactor to drag off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu(), so we later on can
use off_reg for generalizing some of the checks for all pointer types.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: fix minor contextual conflict for 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
